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Jennifer J. Llewellyn*

A Comment on the
Complementary Jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court:
Adding Insult to Injury in
Transitional Contexts?

The author examines the principle of complementarity on which the jurisdiction
of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is based. Unlike its predecessors, the
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the ICC
can only take jurisdiction over a case when a state is unwilling or unable to
investigate or prosecute. The Court is thus designed to complement the work of
national criminal courts. This article assesses whether this admissibility standard
will allow the ICC to complement the work of truth commissions like that of the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It concludes that the
prospect of an ICC poised to assert itsjurisdiction in cases where countries have
chosen to forego prosecution in favour of a South African-style truth commission
could undermine the effectiveness of such commissions. Such a prospect might
thus dissuade states from utilizing truth commissions, thereby adding insult to
already existing injuries in countries undergoing transition from pasts marred by
gross violations of human rights.
L'auteur s'interroge sur le principe de la compl6mentarti sur lequel repose la
comp6tence de la Cour pgnale internationale. Contrairement aux tribunaux
p6naux internationaux qui l'ont prdc6d6, notamment ceux pour le Rwanda et
I'ancienne Yougoslavie, la Cour p6nale internationale ne peut intervenir qu'a
partir du moment oCi un Etat refuse de traduire une cause devant ses propres
tribunaux ou en est incapable. La Cour p6nale internationale joue donc un r6le
complgmentaire par rapport i celui de I'appareiljudiciaire des 6tats-nations.
Cependant ce critgre d'admissibilit6 permet-il a la Cour p~naleinternationale de
jouer ce m~me r6le par rapport aux commissions d'enqugte comme la South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Commission sud-africaine sur la
recherche de la v6rit6 etde la rgconciliation). Ainsi les pays qui, au lieu de recourir
aux tribunaux, choisiraient de cr6er une commission d'enqu~te fond6e sur le
modele sud-africain, pourraient 6tre interpell6s par la Courp6nale internationale
conclut I'auteur.Ceci aurait pour consequence de dissuader le recours a la voie
extrajudiciaire entravant s6rieusement le redressement de la situation dans les
pays accabl6s par un lourd pass6 d'abus des droits de la personne.

* Assistant Professor Dalhousie Law School. B.A. (McMaster), M.A. (Queen's), LL.B.

(Toronto), LL.M. (Harvard). I wish to thank Ken Anderson, Bruce Archibald, Richard
Goldstone, Blake Brown and Hallett Llewellyn for their valuable comments. I owe a debt to
Robert Howse and Ron Slye for their continued support and insight into these issues.
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Introduction
The preamble to the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal
Court (ICC) emphasizes that the new Court "shall be complementary to
national criminal jurisdictions." In a convocation address at the University
of Witwatersrand in South Africa, Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the
United Nations, considered the effect that the new Court might have on
countries opting for a South African-style truth and reconciliation
commission as a means of dealing with past human rights abuses. He
assured the audience that,
[tihe purpose of the clause [which allows the Court to intervene where the
state is 'unwilling or unable' to exercise jurisdiction] is to ensure that
mass-murderers and other arch-criminals cannot shelter behind a State run
by themselves or their cronies, or take advantage of a general breakdown
of law and order. No one should imagine that it would apply to a case like
South Africa's, where the regime and the conflict which causedthe crimes
have come to an end, and the victims have inheritedpower.'

This article asks whether such application is actually beyond the realm of
imagination. It examines the principle of complementarity upon which
the jurisdiction of the ICC is founded and inquires whether the ICC as it
is currently envisioned would complement the work of South Africanstyle truth commission processes or whether it would, instead, add insult
to already existing injuries in countries emerging from pasts marred by
massive human rights abuses. The paper concludes that not only could

1. As quoted in C. Villa-Vicencio, "Why Perpetrators Should Not Always Be Prosecuted:

Where the International Criminal Court and Truth Commissions Meet" (2000) 49 Emory L.J.
205 at 222 (emphasis added).
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one imagine the ICC posing an obstacle to states contemplating South
African-style alternatives to dealing with past abuses, such an outcome
is even perhaps likely given the wording and the structure of the Rome
Statute.
I. The Principle of Complementarity
As Johan D. van der Vyver explains, the deliberations on the ICC
added a new word to the English language: 'complementarity' - or a new
meaning to the word as defined by American English. ... Within the

meaning of ICC usage, 'complementarity' denotes a secondary role - not
in importance but in the sequence of events. In other words, national courts
have the first right and obligation to prosecute perpetrators of international
crimes, and because ICC jurisdiction is complementary to national courts,
ICC jurisdiction can only be invoked if the national court is unwilling or
unable to prosecute.2
Thisjurisdictional arrangement is a significant departure from the structure
of the precursors to the ICC: the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR respectively).
The ad hoc tribunals were established by the United Nations Security
Council and given primacy over national courts.3 The ICTY and ICTR
are able to seize jurisdiction over any case, pending in any court, at any
time, so long as the case falls within their authority. 4 The primacy of the
ad hoc tribunals raised for the first time the issue of the relationship

2. J. D. van der Vyver, "Personal and Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court" (2000) 14 Emory Int'l L. Rev. I at 66.
3. Statute of the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, SC Res. 827,
3217th Mtg., UN Doc. SfRES/827 (1993) art. 9(2); Statute of the International Criminal

TribunalforRwanda, SC Res. 955 3453d Mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) art. 8(2). See also
Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, Prosecutorv. Dusko Tadic A/K/A "Dule ",

(1995) Case No. IT-94- 1, (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial
Chamber), online: United Nations <http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/
100895.htm> (date accessed: 26 May 2002) [hereinafter Tadic Trial]; Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Prosecutorv. Dusko Tadic A/K/A "Dule"

(1995) Case No. IT-94-1, (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals
Chamber), online: United Nations <http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal /decision-e/51002.htm>
(date accessed: 26 May 2002) [hereinafter Tadic appeal]; J. Pejic, "The International Criminal
Court Statute: An Appraisal Of The Rome Package" (2000) 34 Int'l Lawyer 65 at 80-81; J.
Pejic, "The Tribunal and the ICC: Do Precedents MatterT' (1997) 60 Albany L. Rev. 841 at
854-855. For a general discussion of the jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals see B. S. Brown,
"Primacy Or Complementarity: Reconciling The Jurisdiction Of National Courts And
International Criminal Tribunals" (1998) 23 Yale 1.Int'l L. 383.
4. See J.J. Llewellyn & S. Raponi, "The Protection of Human Rights Through International
Criminal Law: A Conversation with Madam Justice Louise Arbour, Chief Prosecutor for the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda" (1999) 57 U.
Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 83 at 94-95 [hereinafter: Arbour] for a discussion of practical effects of
the tribunals' jurisdiction.
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between national and international courts.' The primacy of the ICTY and
the ICTR' sjurisdiction has not been the subject of much criticism in large
part because of the limited nature of the tribunals' mandates. 6 It did,
however, place the issue of primary versus complementary jurisdiction
squarely on the table in the early stages of the negotiations over the ICC.7
States were concerned about protecting their rights to try those responsible
for perpetrating war crimes within the bounds of their own criminal
justice systems - to preserve their right to deal with their own citizens in
a manner consistent with their laws. Granting the ICC primacy over
national courts would, it was thought by some, result in a serious
interference with State sovereignty. 8 After difficult negotiations during
the fourth session of the Preparatory Committee in August 1997, an
agreement was reached on the admissibility standard for cases coming
before the ICC. Once compromise was reached on admissibility, the issue
was not reopened for substantive negotiation during the Rome
Conference. 9 According to this standard, now contained in Article 17 of
the Rome Statute, the ICC must find a case inadmissible if it is being
investigated or prosecuted by a State that has jurisdiction over the case,
"unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution."'"

5. Brown, supra note 3 at 385.
6. The lack of concern over this issue is also likely related to the fact that the judicial systems
in question were obviously unable (in the case of Rwanda) or unwilling (in the case of the
former Yugoslavia) to deal with the situations at issue.
7. See generally, M. P. Scharf, "The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court" (1999) 32 Cornell Int'l L.J. 507 at 521-522. As the author notes, the issue was
raised in the context of a concern over whether the Court would prevent efforts to halt further
abuses and restore peace.
8. Van der Vyver, supra note 2 at 67-68.
9. M. Bergsmo, "The Jurisdictional R6gime of the International Criminal Court (Part I,
Articles 11-19)" (1998) 6:4 Eur. J. of Crime, Crim. L. & Crim. Just. 345 at 360. The issue was
only dealt with throughout the remaining negotiations in the context of addressing conflicting
provisions within the draft statute. See also, Van der Vyver, supra note 2 at 68-69, "...the
Preparatory Committee eventually did reach consensus on the question of complementarity
and transmitted to Rome an unbracketed provision that spelt out the substance of its meaning.
The wording was received in undiluted form in the final statute." But see Scharf, supra note
7 at 522. He suggests that while the issue of what complementarity would mean for the domestic
efforts to halt abuse and ensure peace through amnesties was discussed at this stage of the
negotiations, it was not resolved at the Diplomatic Conference. In fact, he claims the issue was
never fully resolved and as a result "the provisions that were adopted reflect 'creative
ambiguity"' leaving the question an open one with which the Court will have to contend.
10. Rome Statute ofTheInternationalCriminalCourt,17 July 1998, U.N. Doe A/CONF 183/
9th (as corrected 10 November 1998 and 12 July 1999) art. 17.1 (a) online: United Nations
<http://www.un.orgllaw/icc/statute/romefra.htm> (date accessed: 26 May 2002) [hereinafter
Rome Statute].
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As it stands, then, the International Criminal Court is intended to
complement the work of national courts. It is only when states are
unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute that the ICC can assert its
jurisdiction over a case. Many states have lauded this jurisdictional
arrangement as a means of restricting the reach of the ICC. " Others have
criticized the admissibility standard fearing it will weaken the Court's
independence and power.1 2 There has been less consideration, however,
of the effect the complementary jurisdiction provision might have on
states choosing to deal with those who commit crimes within the
jurisdiction of the ICC via alternative mechanisms rather than through
national courts. 3 The ICC was designed to complement national court
systems but what about institutions like the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission? How would this truth commission model
fare under the admissibility standard? Will the ICC assume jurisdiction
over cases when countries have chosen to deal with them through these
processes rather than through the courts? In other words, will the ICC's
jurisdiction add insult to injury in transitional contexts by precluding
truth commissions as a viable means of dealing with the past?

11. For example, David J.Scheffer, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues and Head
of the U.S. Delegation to the UN Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of a Permanent
International Criminal Court, in Department of State testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 23 July 1998. Scheffer identified the improved regime
of complementary jurisdiction as one of the achievements of the U.S. delegation in the
negotiations over the ICC statute.
12. See e.g.Arbour, supranote 4 at 96. See also van der Vyver, supranote 2 at 68-69. He notes
that "[i]nitially, some delegations in the Ad Hoc Committee and Preparatory Committee
lamented the fact that complementarity was included in the Preamble because they believed
that it afforded to the principle of complementarity too great a significance. The view was that
the concept of complementarity should not create a presumption in favor of the jurisdiction of
national courts and that the ICC should, on the contrary, be entrusted with primacy of
jurisdiction."
13. Two notable exceptions are Scharf's discussion of whether an exception to the ICC
jurisdiction might be made for amnesties generally, not limited to those embedded in truth
commission processes (supranote 7), and Van der Vyver's consideration of the significance
of the principle of complementarity in the context of a general examination of the ICC's
jurisdiction (supra note 2). Also see Villa-Vicencio's discussion of the potential relationship
between the ICC and truth commissions. The author does not delve into the legal implications
of the principle of complementarity (supranote 1). Recently this issue was mentioned by Marc
Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs for the United States, in his statement
explaining the decision by the Bush administration to withdraw support for the ICC statute. M.
Grossman, "American Foreign Policy and the International Criminal Court" Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C. 6 May 2002 online: U.S. Department of
State < http:/Iwww.state.gov/p19949.htm> (date accessed: 26 May 2002).
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II. Truth Commissions

During the past two decades truth commissions have become commonplace
on the landscape of state efforts to deal with pasts marred by violations
of human rights and war crimes.' 4 Daan Bronkhorst, in his survey of
initiatives included under the rubric of truth commissions since the mid1980's, identifies two distinct periods in the development of these
institutions. The 1991 truth commission in Chile serves, he suggests, as
the line of demarcation between these periods. 5 For the most part,
commissions in the early period (before 1991) lacked independence and
6
amounted to little more than government puppets and propaganda agents.
The latter period was different. Commissions were frequently endowed
with investigative powers that enabled them to undertake more substantial
and independent investigations. 7 According to Bronkhorst's research,
by 1995 truth commissions investigating past human rights abuses had
appeared in approximately 30 countries. 8

14. H. J. Steiner, "Introduction" in Truth Commissions: A ComparativeAssessment - An
interdisciplinarydiscussion held at Harvard Law School (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Law
School Human Rights Program, 1997) at 7. The introduction also notes that "[t]he historical
analogies to today's truth commissions range from international commissions of inquiry to
many forms of national investigative bodies. Nonetheless, in major respects we witness today
an institution that is distinctive: the number of countries utilizing it within so brief a period, its
popular appeal and powerful political effects, and the ambitious scope of its work." Ibid. at 10.
See also P. B. Hayner, UnspeakableTruths: ConfrontingState TerrorandAtrocity(New York:
Routledge Press, 2001); P. B. Hayner, "Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A
Comparative Study" (1994) 16 Hum. Rts. Q. 597 [hereinafter: Hayner 2]; M. Parlevliet,
"Considering Truth: Dealing with a Legacy of Gross Human Rights Violations" (1998) 16
Netherlands Q. of Hum. Rts. 141; D. Bronkhorst, Truth and Reconciliation: Obstacles and
Opportunitiesfor Human Rights (Amsterdam: Amnesty International, Dutch Section 1995) at
10; and R.I. Rotberg & D. Thompson, eds., Truth V. Justice: The Morality of Truth
Commissions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).
15. Bronkhorst, supra note 14 at 70-72. See also Hayner 2, supra note 14 at 606-607. The
author also notes the differences between truth commissions pre and post 1991. On the Chile
Commission see J. Correa, "Dealing with Past Human Rights Violations: The Chilean Case
After Dictatorship" (1992) 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1455.
16. Bronkhorst, supra note 14 at 69-70. As examples of early commissions he cites those in
Israel, Guinea, Uganda and Argentina.
17. Bronkhorst, supra note 14 at 72-77. Examples of commissions during this later period
include those in Chad, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Sri Lanka and Thailand. The
investigative powers these commissions enjoyed generally included the ability to take
statements and protect witnesses.
18. Bronkhorst, supra note 14 at 10. Hayner relates the marked increase in truth commissions
to the publication of the report from the United Nations Commission on Truth for El Salvador
in 1993. Hayner 2, supra note 14 at 598.
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The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC),
established in 1995, marks yet a third period in the development of the
truth commission model. 9 Though the Commission was modeled after
the Chilean Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it enjoyed much
broader investigative powers.20 The South African Commission also
developed the potential of such institutions as meaningful alternatives to
trials to deal with past abuses, through the introduction of amnesty into
the truth commission process.
Truth commissions have often come on the heels of general or blanket
amnesties granted at the end of a conflict.2 Such blanket amnesties often
have the effect of covering up the facts of what happened and who was
19. The Commission was established by the Promotionof National Unity andReconciliation
Act, The Republic of South Africa, Act No.34 of 1995, as amended by The Promotion of
National Unity and ReconciliationAmendment Act No. 84of 1995 [hereinafter: TRCAct]. The
Commission was charged with the difficult task of establishing "...as complete a picture as
possible of the causes, nature and extent of gross violations of human rights which occurred
between 1 March 1960and 1OMay 1994." Section l(l) (ix) of the TRCAct, which governs the
TRC Act, defines gross violations of human rights as the violation of human rights through (a) the killing , abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment of any person; or
(b) any attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command or procurement to
commit an act referred to in paragraph (a),
which emanated from the conflicts of the past and which was committed during the
period 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date within or outside the Republic, and the
commission of which was advised, planned, directed, commanded or ordered, by
any person acting with a political motive.
See generally Truth andReconciliationCommission ofSouth Africa Report (Cape Town: Juta
& Co Ltd., 1998). The report consists of five volumes: the first deals with the guiding concepts
of the TRC and the political and legislative background to its establishment; the second offers
a national overview of the gross violations of human rights in South Africa during the period
under investigation; the third addresses gross human rights violations from the perspective of
the victim; the fourth examines the broader social, political, and economic context of gross
human rights violations, including accounts and analysis of hearings that dealt with particular
institutions and groups, including women, children, military conscripts, the legal and medical
professions, the media, and business; the fifth contains analysis, conclusions, and the
recommendations of the TRC Act.
20. Section 29 and 32 of the TRC Act, supra note 19. The Commission was vested with the
authority, in connection with or for the purposes of conducting an investigation or a hearing,
to: conduct inspections in loco, force individuals to produce relevant material for inspection,
subpoena individuals to appear before and give evidence to the Commission and seize any
article or thing relevant to an investigation or hearing.
21. For example, in the last twenty years amnesty laws have been passed in Chile (1978),
Brazil (1979), Columbia (1982), Uruguay (1986), Argentina (1983, 1986, 1987, 1989),
Guatemala (1986), Honduras (1987), El Salvador (1987, 1993), South Africa (1990, 1992,
1993) and Peru (1995). See generally R. Slye, "Justice and the South African Amnesty" in W.
Verwoerd & C. Villa-Vicencio eds., Looking Back/Reaching Forward:Reflections on the
South African Truth and ReconciliationCommission (Cape Town: University of Cape Town
Press, 2000)174. Slye argues that amnesties of one form or another were used to limit the
accountability of individuals responsible for gross violations of human rights in every major
political transition in the twentieth century.
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responsible. Truth commissions are often viewed as a means of discovering
and revealing the truth of what happened in the past in the wake of a
generalized amnesty grant. They provide some remedy to amnesty
induced amnesia and are founded on the firm belief that truth is a
necessary precondition of reconciliation. Amnesties, however, often
present the greatest obstacle to the work of these commissions. The
impunity assured by blanket amnesties means that those with the most
information, the perpetrators, have no reason to participate, and, as a
result, commissions are often only able to offer at best an incomplete
picture of the past - one told primarily by the victims. South Africa set out
to tackle this obstacle to achieving the goal of truth and reconciliation.
South Africa also faced an amnesty provision negotiated as part of the
transition of power from the Apartheid regime.2 2 The South African
parliament did not, however, enact a blanket amnesty to fulfill the
constitutional requirement of amnesty. Instead, they chose to use amnesty
as a vehicle for attaining truth and reconciliation. Amnesty, in the South
African context, was individualized and embedded in the truth and
reconciliation process. This process also included the victims against

22. The amnesty provision was negotiated at such a late stage in the multi-party negotiations
over the Interim Constitution that it was added as a postamble located after section 251, the last
section in the document. The postamble, entitled "National Unity and Reconciliation,"
included the following provision with respect to amnesty:
In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted
in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and
committed in the course of the conflicts of the past. To this end, Parliament under
this Constitution shall adopt a law determining a firm cut-off date, which shall be a
date after 8 October 1990 and before 6 December 1993, and providing for the
mechanisms, criteria and procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which
such amnesty shall be dealt with at any time after the law has been passed (Republic
of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. The "postamble" is located after s. 251).
These provisions were incorporated into the final Constitution tabled May 8, 1996 under s. 22
of Schedule 6 on Transitional Arrangements.
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whom human rights violations were perpetrated, 23 thereby enabling the
commission to obtain information from both victims and perpetrators and
to create as complete a picture as possible of the events of the past.
Amnesty, in the South African process, was granted in exchange for
truth. In order to gain amnesty, individuals had to make application to the

Commission and offer full disclosure of their actions.24 If these actions
were associated with a political mQtive,25 and found proportional to their
objective, then amnesty would be granted with respect to those specific
acts. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission thus
managed to avoid the concerns associated with blanket amnesty by
bringing perpetrators into the truth and reconciliation process and thereby
building accountability into amnesty.
The South African model offers countries undergoing democratic
transition a viable alternative to criminal prosecutions in the wake of
mass human rights abuses. But, the prospects of an international criminal
court poised to seize jurisdiction from countries unwilling or unable to
prosecute, could threaten this newly developed and promising alternative
with extinction.

23.

The TRC Act defines victims as(a) persons who, individually or together with one or more persons, suffered harm
in the form of physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, pecuniary loss or a
substantial impairment of human rights (i) as a result of a gross violation of human rights; or
(ii) as a result of an act associated with a political objective for which amnesty has
been granted;
(b) persons who, individually or together with one or more persons, suffered harm
in the form of physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, pecuniary loss or a
substantial impairment of human rights, as a result of such person intervening to
assist persons contemplated in paragraph (a) who were in distress or to prevent
victimization of such persons; and
(c) such relatives or dependants of victims as may be prescribed. Section 1(1 )(xix).

24. See section 20 of the TRC Act, supra note 19.
25. See section 20(2) of the TRC Act, supra note 19 which specifies that amnesty can only
be granted with respect to:
... any act or omission which constitutes an offence or delict which, according to the
criteria in subsection (3), is associated with a political objective and which is
advised, planned, directed, commanded, ordered or committed within or outside the
Republic during the period 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date...
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III. Article 17
Article 17 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
26
provides the grounds upon which a case will be admissible to the Court.
Article 17.1 reads:
1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court
shall determine that a case is inadmissible where:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the investigation orprosecution;

(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over
it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless
the decision resultedfrom the unwillingness or inability of the State
genuinely to prosecute;
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the
subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under
article 20, paragraph 3;
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the
Court.
Under the terms of Article 17 a case is inadmissible if a State with
jurisdiction is investigating or prosecuting or has investigated and decided
not to prosecute. A case will also be inadmissible where the person
concerned has already been prosecuted,27 or if the case is not of sufficient
gravity to justify further action by the Court. 21 There is, however, a
qualification to these rules; a case that would otherwise be inadmissible
can be admitted if the State concerned is unwilling or unable to genuinely
investigate or prosecute.
26. Rome Statute, supra note 10. The statute was adopted on July 17, 1998. The treaty was
closed for signatures as of December 31, 2000. 139 countries signed the treaty as of that date.
The Statute came into effect 60 days after the 60th country ratifies the treaty. On April 11, 2002,
10 states ratified the treaty bringing the total number of ratifications to 66, surpassing the
required number of ratifications to bring the treaty into force. The Rome Treaty entered into
force on July 1st 2002. For a listing of the signators and ratifications see The CICC International
Criminal Court Home Page at http://www.igc.org/icc/rome/html/ratify.html.
27. See Article 20 of the Rome Statute, supranote 10. This provision is discussed later in this
section.
28. This determination is in the hands of the prosecutor. Article 53 grants the prosecutor a
similar discretion with respect to which cases to pursue. The article allows the prosecutor to
refuse to investigate a case where there is "substantial reason to believe that an investigation
would not serve the interests ofjustice." This discretion is subject to review by the trial chamber
according to section 3 of Article 53.
This paper is narrowly focused on the admissibility standard. However, it is worth noting
that another source to which one might look to protect the truth commission option is the power
granted to the Security Council under Article 16 to request the Court not to commence an
investigation or prosecution or to defer any proceedings already in progress. This provision
essentially allows the Security Council to trump the power of the Court where matters of peace
and security are at issue. If countries fail in their bid to avoid the jurisdiction of the Court using
Article 17 of the Statute one option might be to request the intervention of the Security Council.
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Whether a state is unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate or
prosecute is ultimately left for the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court to
determine. 2 9 The burden of proof rests with the Prosecutor seeking to
admit a case for consideration. Given the frequency with which countries
undergoing democratic transitions are turning to truth commission models,
it seems likely that the Court will eventually face the question as to

whether a state's choice to forego traditional prosecution in favour of a
South African-style truth commission warrants an assertion ofjurisdiction.
That is, whether cases currently being dealt with or previously dealt with
via a truth commission should be deemed admissible under Article 17. In
addressing this question, will the ICC, while complementing national
courts, nevertheless fail to respect the role of alternative mechanisms for
dealing with past violations of human rights?
The plain wording of the Rome Statute suggests the existence of a truth

commission process would not prevent the ICC from admitting a case for
prosecution. The key phrase in this respect is "unwilling to genuinely
investigate or prosecute.""0 A truth commission process, which includes

the provision of amnesty, precludes prosecution (at least for those granted
amnesty) and thus would seem to imply an unwillingness to prosecute.

29. See Rome Statute, supranote 10 at Article 18.2 and 19.6. Determinations of admissibility
will be referred to the Pre-Trial Chamber prior to the confirmation of the charges. After such
time the Court will consider any challenges to admissibility. Sections 2 and 3 of Article 17 offer
the Court some guidance in determining unwillingness and inability. They provide:
2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider,
having regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law,
whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made
for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances
is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially,
and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
3. In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider
whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial
system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and
testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.
30. As section 3 explains, "inability" refers to contexts where there is a total or substantial
collapse or unavailability of the national judicial system. While it is possible that a truth
commission approach might be attempted in this context it is more often the case that truth
commissions are chosen instead of the court system and thus are more likely to fall under the
category of unwilling not inability.
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One might inquire whether there is room within the wording of Article
17 to determine a case inadmissible owing to the fact that it is being dealt
with, or has been dealt with, through a national truth commission process.
The first avenue to explore in this regard is the investigative role of truth
commissions. Section 1, paragraph (a) provides that a case will be
deemed inadmissible if it is being investigated or prosecuted by a state
which has jurisdiction. The use of the word "or" might suggest that all that
is required to preserve the primacy of a national process is for one or the
other activity to be underway. Thus, the argument might be made that so
long as the case is being investigated by a state the ICC could not assume
jurisdiction. Further, since the Statute does not specify otherwise, it
would seem an investigation ought to be sufficient regardless of whether
it is carried out via ordinary investigative institutions (such as the police
or other security apparatus) or via a special commission such as a truth
commission. An interpretation that reads the requirements of investigation
and prosecution as distinct and separable leaves room for a state to argue
it is investigating the case in question even though such an investigation
is not being conducted for the purposes of prosecution.
It seems likely that such an assertion would protect against the ICC
taking jurisdiction while a truth commission is in the midst of an
investigation. The problem with this interpretation, however, arises when
paragraph (a) is read in conjunction with paragraph (b), which accords
with common rules of interpretation requiring that sections be read in
their entirety. Paragraph (b) specifically addresses the situation in which
an investigation has been conducted and a decision has been made not to
prosecute. Here again, such cases are inadmissible unless the decision
resulted from an unwillingness or inability of a state genuinely to
prosecute. This section suggests why the reference was made in paragraph
(a) to investigation or prosecution. It was precisely to protect cases
where, after a full investigation, a state decides not to pursue prosecution.
There may, then, be cases where investigation alone is enough to stave off
ICC jurisdiction. However, these cases seem to be limited to those where
prosecution was a live option and indeed was the motivating factor
behind the investigation. Paragraph (b) clearly contemplates a state
making a decision not to prosecute after an investigation has been
conducted. In the case of a truth commission process with an amnesty
provision, the decision with respect to prosecution is never on the table.
A decision with respect to prosecution is only an issue after an individual
has applied for and been denied amnesty. A state utilizing a truth
commission mechanism would thus seem to fall into the "unwilling"
category, having chosen amnesty over prosecutions well before
investigations began.

204

The Dalhousie Law Journal

Perhaps one way states utilizing a truth commission process might
avail themselves of the protection against the ICC's interference offered
by the admissibility standard, is to claim that the decision against
prosecution was not technically made until the results of an investigation
revealed whether or not the individual qualified for amnesty. One might
expect such an assertion to be met by the objection that this is inconsistent
with the intention of Article 17 because states using a South African-style
truth commission process will forego prosecution if the conditions for
amnesty are met even where an investigation reveals clear evidence that
the individual committed the crime alleged. The choice to offer amnesty,
then, amounts to an unwillingness to prosecute and cannot, it seems, be
likened to a decision not to proceed on the basis of a lack of evidence. This
response is consistent with the traditional Western understandings of the
relationship between investigation and prosecution processes; however,
it is important to note that there is no limitation in the Statute on what
might count as an acceptable reason to forego prosecution. Indeed, it is
often the case that decisions about whether to prosecute a particular case
in the domestic context are based on a number of factors only one of which
is the evidentiary basis of the case. Other factors can include resource
allocation concerns, the likelihood of conviction, the effect of prosecution
on the community, and other political considerations. 3' Given the Statute's
silence on the scope of legitimate reasons to forego prosecution after a full
investigation it seems at least possible that the existence of a truth
commission process might be viewed as an acceptable reason to forgo
prosecution. However, making such a case on political grounds may be
difficult given that the purpose of the Statute is to prevent governments
32
from shielding perpetrators from prosecution for political reasons.
Further, the inclusion of inability as a ground upon which the Court could
assert jurisdiction seems to preclude lack of resources or harm to the
community as legitimate reasons to forego prosecution and thus might
invite the Court's intervention.

31. The latter is perhaps a more prominent factor in jurisdictions where the prosecutor is an
elected official.
32. The preamble of the Rome Statute reads in part:
... Afflrmin2 that the most serious crime%of concern to the international community
as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be
ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international
cooperation,
Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus
to contribute to the prevention of such crimes, ...
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Paragraph (c) contemplates another ground for determining a case
inadmissible, that is, where a person has already been tried for the conduct
that is the subject of the charge. Individuals are also protected against
doublejeopardy by Article 20, which embodies the international principle
of ne bis in idem. 3 3 For those attempting to defend the use of truth
commissions, this raises the issue of whether being the subject of a
hearing to determine whether or not amnesty will be granted would count
as having been "tried". Van der Vyver claims it "is difficult to predict
whether amnesty hearings of truth commissions will qualify as proceedings
of 'another court' for the purposes of ne bis in idem.' ' 34 At first blush, the
answer seems to be that it obviously would not. The common understanding
of "tried" means tried by a Court, and a truth commission is clearly not
a national court as it does not have the authority to carry out prosecutions.
In fact, truth commissions (at least those of the South African type)
preclude individuals from being tried by granting amnesty. But the case
may not be quite this simple. As explained earlier, the South African
model of truth commission does not grant a general amnesty to all those
involved in the conflict; that would prevent all prosecutions for acts
committed during the period specified by the terms of the amnesty act.
Rather, under the South African model, individuals must apply and

qualify for amnesty before such protection is granted. For applications
involving gross violations of human rights (crimes within thejurisdiction
of the ICC), individuals must appear before an Amnesty Committee in a

33. Rome Statute, supra note 10, Art. 20 provides that:
1. Except as provided in this Statute, no person shall be tried before the Court with
respect toconduct which formed the basis of crimes for which the person has been
convicted or acquittedby the Court.
2. No person shall be tried by another court for a crime referred to in article 5 for
which thatperson has already been convicted or acquitted by the Court.
3. No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under
article 6, 7 or 8 [the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court] shall be tried
by the Court with respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other
court:
(a) Were for the purposes of shielding the person concerned from criminal
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance
with the norms of due process recognized by international law and were
conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an
intent to bring the person concerned to justice (Supra note 10).
34. Van der Vyver, supra note 2 at 81 (footnotes omitted). He does however advocate that
"the ICC ought to be sensitive to bonafide attempts of countries in transition to come to terms
with their past and seek reconciliation through strategies of restorative justice." Ibid. at 82.
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public hearing. At these hearings amnesty applicants must offer full
disclosure of their actions and demonstrate that they have met the other
conditions for amnesty.35 Given that individuals must admit responsibility
for their actions, and give a full account of what they did and why, an
individualized amnesty process more closely resembles a pardon than
general blanket amnesty provisions.36 As paragraph 17.1 (c) does not

require individuals to have previously been found guilty or punished, it
requires only that they have been tried, this section would seem to
preclude the court from admitting cases where an individual was tried,
convicted, and then granted a pardon, or even situations where a pardon
followed a guilty plea (instead of a trial) and sentencing by a Court. One
might argue, then, that the individualized amnesty process ought to count
as having been tried by a Court. However, individualized amnesties and
pardons are different in a few significant respects that might dissuade the
ICC from rendering cases inadmissible where an individual has gone
through a truth commission process. Amnesties, even when they are
individualized, are mandatory so long as the individual meets all the
requirements set out in the act, whereas, whether to grant a pardon or not
is generally a prerogative power of the executive. Also, pardons are
granted after a prosecution has taken place, or, in the case of a guilty plea,
after a court has passed sentence on an individual. A truth commission
process does not afford courts the same opportunity to rule on a case
before an amnesty is granted.
There may be further problems with utilizing the Article 20 ne bis in
idem provision to insulate against the interference of the ICC where a
truth commission process has been undertaken. Article 20 contains two
exceptions to the ne bis in idem principle, namely in those cases where the
proceedings in the other court
(a) Were for the purposes of shielding the person concerned from criminal
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in
accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international law
and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.37

35. See generally section 20 of the TRC Act, supra note 19.
36. Van der Vyver offers a slightly different approach to the amnesty/double jeopardy
question. lie likens amnesty to a non-guilty finding and claims that given this interpretation a
plea of autrefois acquit might be entered by an accused brought before the ICC who had
previously been granted amnesty with respect to the crime at issue (supra note 2 at 78-79). I
think there are difficulties with analogizing amnesty with a non-guilty finding. The analogy
seems particularly strained in the context of a truth commission process where individuals must
admit responsibility publicly for their crimes as a precondition of amnesty.
37. Rome Statute, supra note 10, Art. 20, s. 3(a), 3(b).
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With respect to the first exception the argument might be made that truth
commission proceedings function as a means of shielding perpetrators.
This might be thought to be particularly true where the amnesty was
demanded by the outgoing regime as a condition of the transfer of power.
Even in cases where truth commissions are not portrayed in this lightwhere they represent ademocratic choice of a state to provide accountability
for past abuses-the second exception to the ne bis in idem may be
problematic for a state seeking to prevent the ICC from asserting
jurisdiction in the face of a truth and reconciliation process. Quite simply
the Court may find that an amnesty hearing in a truth commission process
was not conducted in a manner consistent with an intent to bring the
person concerned to justice. The success of this argument will of course
depend on the understanding of justice animating the Rome Statute. The
references to prosecution and punishment in the preamble and elsewhere
in the statute suggest that the reference to bringing the person to justice
in Article 20 will likely be interpreted as requiring at least prosecution and
probably punishment as well." Whether a state will be able to ward off
the jurisdiction of the ICC in order to pursue a truth commission process
seems then to depend on a close examination of the call for prosecution
in the ICC's statute. The next section explores this issue in an attempt to
determine whether there might be room for other conceptions of justice
despite the wording of the current statute.
IV. What Does the Duty to ProsecuteRequire?
The reference to the word "tried" in Article 17.1 (c) reflects the prosecution
requirement evident in the rest of section 1, Article 17. Admissibility thus
may turn on the definition of prosecution underlying Article 17. In this
respect, the Rome Statute must be read in the context of the international
legal framework out of which it was born. In the aftermath of World War
11 the Nuremberg trials established that a state's treatment of its own
citizens was appropriately the concern of international law.39 As a result,
many of the multilateral treaties since the end of World War II have begun

38. For a discussion of the other possible conceptions of justice appropriate to transitional
contexts see J. J. Llewellyn & R. Howse, "Institutions for Restorative Justice: The South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission" (1999) 49 U. Toronto L.J. 355; J. J. Llewellyn,
"Justice for South Africa: Restorative Justice and the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission" in C. M. Koggel, ed., Moral Issues in GlobalPerspectives(Peterborough, Ont.:
Broadview Press, 1999) at 96; J. J. Llewellyn, "Just Amnesty and Private International Law"
in C. Scott, ed., Tortureas Tort: ComparativePerspectivesin the Developmentof Transnational
HumanRights Litigation(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) at 567 [hereinafter "Just Amnesty"].
39. See H. Koh, "Transnational Public Law Litigation" (1991) 100 Yale L.J. 2347 at 2348;
N. Roht-Arriaza, Impunity andHuman Right in InternationalLaw andPractice (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1995) at 24 [hereinafter Impunity and Human Rights].
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the task of defining the obligations of states to their citizens. One such
obligation is "to investigate violations of personal integrity, take action
against those responsible, and provide redress to victims."'4 The aspect
of this obligation requiring action against those responsible has come to
be known in international law as "the duty to prosecute."41 The necessity
of the ICC is often defended in terms of this duty to prosecute under
international law. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that a South
African type of truth commission would not meet the demands of the duty
to prosecute if that duty is taken literally to require that individuals be
tried by a court according to the rules and procedures of domestic criminal
law. However, it is worth looking behind the language of prosecution to
inquire as to the initial motivation for this duty. A brief examination of the
roots of the duty to prosecute reveals it as shorthand for accountability
and redress. If this is so, would a South African-style truth commission
satisfy these requirements? If the answer were yes, this would seem to
suggest that the ICC should respect such processes in so far as they
achieve the same goals through other means.
Rooted as it is in the triad of obligations - investigate, take action
against those responsible, and provide redress - the duty to prosecute is
inextricably linked to these other obligations.4 2 This ought to provide
some clue as to the underlying purpose of prosecution. An examination
of the justificatory language surrounding the duty to prosecute suggests
that prosecution is thought necessary in order to fulfill the other two
obligations in the triad.43 Quite simply, prosecution is viewed to be a

40. Impunity and Human Rights, supra note 39 at 24.
41. See D. Orentlicher, "Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations
of a Prior Regime" (1991) 100 Yale L.J. 2537; T.M. Scanlon, "Punishment and the Rule of
Law" in H. Koh & R. Slye eds., DeliberativeDemocracyandHumanRights (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1999) at 257.
42. Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras(1988) 9 HRLJ 212 (Inter- American Court of Human
Rights) stands as a watershed in the articulation of this triad particularly with respect to the
Americas.
43. In his progress report, special rapporteur Louis Joinet addressed the connection between
prosecution and these other rights. He explained that "impunity conflicts with the duty to
prosecute and punish the perpetrators of gross violations of human rights which is inherent in
the entitlement of victims to obtain from the State not only material reparation but also
satisfactionof the 'rightto know'or,more precisely,the 'rightto the truth"' L. Joinet, Progress
Report on the question of the impunity ofperpetratorsof violationsof human rights(civil and
political rights) UN Doe. EICN.41Sub.21199319 at para 137 (emphasis added). Likewise,
Special Rapporteur on Impunity (economic, social and cultural rights) El Hadji Guiss6
explained that, "the obligation to protect and promote all human rights includes that to punish
and compensate the harm and damage which result from their violation." E. H. Guiss6, The
Realization of Economic, Social and CulturalRights - Second Interim report on the question
of the impunity of perpetratorsof human rights violations UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/15 at
para 23 (emphasis added).
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requirement in order to get at the truth and to provide redress to victims. 44
Defenders of the duty to prosecute also commonly point to the importance
of holding individuals accountable for wrongdoing. 45 The objective
underlying the duty to prosecute, then, appears to mirror the triad of
obligations of which it was born, namely: to find out what happened,
ensure those responsible are held accountable, and repair the harm
resulting from the wrongdoing. Once this goal is distilled one might ask
why it must be achieved through prosecution. 46 Could a South Africanstyle truth and reconciliation commission not achieve the same goal?
The Court could also look to international law to support the idea that
the duty to prosecute, interpreted as the need for criminal trials, might not
be appropriate in all circumstances. International law offers support for
alternative responses to violations of the laws of war in precisely the
contexts in which truth commissions are often utilized - namely, in the
context of states recovering from internal armed conflict. While the ICC
includes within its jurisdiction crimes committed in both international
and non-international armed conflicts," there is a distinction drawn
between the two within international law, specifically with respect to the
duty to prosecute. The Geneva Conventions are the most often cited
treaties for the duty to prosecute those guilty of grave breaches of
international law. However, the Geneva Conventions may actually serve
to support the case for the ICC deferring to truth commission processes.
It is notable that the provisions in the Geneva Conventions requiring
prosecutions deal with international armed conflicts.48 In contrast,

44. The importance of redress for victims is addressed in the Rome Statute. See Article 75 of
the Rome Statute, supra note 10.
45. See, for example, Human Rights Watch's policy statement on accountability for gross
human rights abuses: "It is a responsibility of governments to seek accountability regardless
of whether the perpetrators of such abuses are officials of the government, or members of antigovernment forces, or others. We oppose laws and practices that purport to immunize those
who have committed gross abuses from the exposure of their crimes, from civil suits for
damages for those crimes, or from criminal investigation, prosecution and punishment."
Human Rights Watch, "Special Issue: Accountability for Past Human Rights Abuses"
(newsletter) (December 1989) No. 4, at 1. See also Orentlicher, supra note 41.
46. In fact, one might go further and ask how it is that prosecutions could actually achieve
these goals. For a discussion of the limits of criminal trials in this respect see Llewellyn &
Howse, supra tote 38.
47. Article 8 (c), Rome Statute, supra note 10.
48. See Scharf, supra note 7 at 516. In his efforts to carve out an amnesty exception to the
ICC's jurisdiction, the author notes that the duty to prosecute does not exist in situations of
internal armed conflict under the Geneva Convention. The author does suggest, however, that
such a duty may still exist (pursuant to Article 8, subsections 2(c) and 2 (e) of the Rome Statute)
with respect to war crimes committed in these conflicts.
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common Article 3, which deals with non-international conflicts, contains
no such explicit duty to prosecute. Furthermore, Article 6.5 of Protocol
II of the Geneva Conventions, which deals exclusively with noninternational armed conflicts, states:
At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant
the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the
armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the
armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained.49
This provision seems to reflect the recognition that a different approach
might be necessary in the context of internal armed conflicts. Van der
Vyver cautions that while the significance of this provision speaks for
itself, "it must not be overstated."5 Read on its face the text of Protocol
II could be taken to support amnesty in even its broadest terms. It could
be interpreted, for example, as supporting blanket or general amnesties
that would, as discussed earlier, thwart rather than assist efforts to
ascertain the truth of what happened and offer redress. Taking this
provision in the context of the purpose of the treaty as a whole, however,
mitigates against such a broad interpretation of the amnesty provision.
The treaty has as its purpose the prevention of war crimes and the
fulfilment of the triad of obligations associated with the duty to prosecute.
Some have used this context to suggest that the amnesty obligation does

49. 1977ProtocolAdditional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, andRelating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-InternationalArmed Conflicts (Protocol II), entered into
force, Dec. 7, 1978. UN Doc. A/32/144, Annex 11 (1977). There was some discussion of
limiting the availability of amnesty to certain offences and for the purpose of reintegrating
former insurgents back into society but none of it was reflected in the final article. As it stands,
amnesties are to be pursued regardless of the nature of the offences committed. For a general
discussion of the provision see H.S. Levie, The Law of Non-InternationalArmed Conflict
(Dordrecht, Netherlands: M. Nijhoff, 1987) at 301; Impunity and Human Rights, supra note
39 at 58-59.
50. Van der Vyver, supra note 2 at 82.
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not apply to grave breaches of international law. 5' Such a restriction
seems overly broad. It is reasonable to read the Protocol in this context as
precluding amnesties that would thwart efforts to fulfil the triad of
obligations under international law. However, as I have argued, this is not
true of all amnesties. Thus while Article 6.5 might sit uncomfortably for
some as a compromise of the duty to prosecute for the sake of peace and
stability, this need not be the case as demonstrated by the example of the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The value of
holding perpetrators accountable and responsible and providing redress
for victims can be preserved in a system that utilizes individualized
amnesties embedded in a commission process aimed at truth and
reconciliation.52 Indeed, such a model stands able to preserve the objectives
of the duty to prosecute while recognizing the wisdom of the amnesty
requirement in Protocol II.

51. The United States, for example, argued in the Tadic trial before the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia that the provisions in the 1949 Geneva Conventions
requiring the prosecution of grave breaches should apply to internal conflicts just as they do
in international conflicts as a matter of customary law. See Tadic Trial, supra note 3. John
Dugard has argued, however, that "state practice at this time is too unsettled to support a rule
of customary international law obliging a successor regime to prosecute those alleged to have
committed crimes against humanity in all circumstances." J. Dugard, "Reconciliation and
Justice: The South African Experience" (1998) 8 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 277 at 306.
Others have argued that Protocol II does not apply to violations of international law at all but
rather only to violations of the national law committed by the parties involved in the conflict.
The International Committee of the Red Cross has taken this position in private correspondence.
See M. Popkin and N. Bhuta "Latin American Amnesties in Comparative Perspective: Can the
Past be Buried?" (1999) 13 Ethics & Int'l Affairs 99 at 103, n. 8. There may be another
significant obstacle for the use of Protocol II as a means of defending the use of amnesties
following internal conflicts and that is the steady erosion of the distinction between international
and internal armed conflict under international law. This distinction is increasingly viewed as
anachronistic to the state-centered nature of international law and impracticable if human rights
are understood in individualistic terms. The creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda is a significant step towards international law applying equally to internal conflicts.
In addition, the ICC statute applies to both international and internal armed conflicts alike. See,
for example, Article 8.2 (c), Rome Statute, supra note 10. As it stands currently, however, the
distinction between internal and international armed conflict persists and thus could be used
to defend against the ICC's assertion of jurisdiction in the case where a truth commission
process is in place. Further, I would argue that there are important differences between internal
and international armed conflict that warrant maintaining the distinction under international
law. Specifically, what is required in order to ensure a peaceful and democratic future post
conflict differs when conflict was internal to a state than when it is external. I am grateful to
Ron Slye for his clarification on this point.
52. My argument thus differs significantly from Scharf's in this respect. Scharf accepts the
characterization of amnesty as a trade off between justice (read: prosecution) and peace and
stability. I do not agree that amnesty need always entail such a trade off. Rather, as embedded
in the context of a truth and reconciliation process, amnesty may well serve the interests of
justice equally as well as prosecution. Thus, the choice between justice and peace may be
avoided.
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If applied to the Rome Statute, an interpretation of the duty to prosecute
as the duty to provide accountability and redress would force the ICC to
respect states' choices regarding the means and mechanisms through
which they deal with violations of the laws of war and human rights, so
long as they meet these criteria. Such an interpretation would enable the
Court to truly complement the work of states to ensure a just response,
rather than risk adding insult to injury by denying states recovering from
internal armed struggle an alternative means of dealing with their past.
V. Forginga Relationship - The Role of the ICC in
Truth Commission Processes
The possibility that the ICC's statute might be interpreted so as to respect
state chosen truth and reconciliation processes raises the question of what
the nature of the relationship between the ICC and South African-style
truth commissions ought to be. Why, one might inquire, must the ICC
defer to thejurisdiction of truth commissions at all? Could these institutions
not co-exist? Why, for instance, could the ICC not take jurisdiction over
the serious cases and leave the rest to be dealt with through whatever
mechanism a state chooses? After all, this will be how the system works
with respect to national courts. Even in situations where the ICC finds a
case admissible (either because the State is unwilling or unable to
investigate or prosecute) the ICC will no doubt be unable to deal with all
the cases arising from a particular conflict. 3 Paragraph (d) of Article 17
acknowledges this reality when it allows the Court to deem a case
inadmissible on the grounds that it is not of sufficient gravity to justify
further action by the ICC. Thus, the Court will focus on the important
cases and leave the State to deal with the rest. This would be true even
where the Court has made a finding that a state is unwilling or unable to
prosecute - a fact that might give the Court reason to proceed carefully
with such determinations. Why, then, given the fact that a truth commission
would probably wind up dealing with the majority of cases anyway, ought
we to care that the ICC might take jurisdiction over a few select cases?
The problem with this sort of relationship between the ICC and a truth
commission is that it could undermine the integrity of the truth commission,
and ultimately might undo the advantages brought by the South African
developments to the truth commission model. The advantage gained by
embedding amnesty in a truth commission process is that it brings
perpetrators into the truth-telling and reconciliation process. Perpetrators
exchange truth for amnesty - a bargain that could be undermined by the
threat of prosecution at the ICC. Individuals might not come forward and

53.

Arbour, supra note 4 at 95.
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risk revealing themselves if their amnesty would be meaningless owing
to the possibility of prosecution by the ICC. Even given the reality that the
ICC could not prosecute everyone, individuals contemplating whether to
apply for amnesty would have no way of estimating whether they would
be subject to prosecution by the ICC or not. The command level of
perpetrators or the nature of their actions might not offer any clear
indication of which cases the ICC would pursue since such choices would
turn upon available evidence. There is no guarantee, for example, that
only those at the very top of the command structure would be subjected
to prosecution. Further, one of the ways in which an individualized
amnesty process works to get perpetrators to participate is by creating fear
that they will be implicated in the amnesty applications submitted by
others. Commissions are thus able to use the evidence of low-level actors
to entice those further up in the chain of command to come forward and
reveal information. This incentive scheme might be disturbed by the
threat of prosecutions at the ICC and if so would ultimately limit the
amount of information available to a commission.
Another problem with the co-existence model is that victims would
likely perceive it as unfair. What would justify pursuing prosecutions in
some cases but denying other victims the right to have those who
perpetrated acts against them prosecuted and punished? The legitimacy
of a truth commission process is derived from the fact that it is the result
of a democratic decision by a state to deal with its past in a particular
way. 4 This legitimacy would be undermined if such decisions were
taken out of a state's hands.
What, if any, role could the ICC play in states that choose a truth and
reconciliation process? Could the ICC complement truth commission
processes? The ICC has the potential to play an important role in ensuring
that prosecutions are pursued against those individuals who are either
denied amnesty or chose not to apply for it. Under these circumstances the
ICC would assume jurisdiction as it would in any situation, with the
notable exception that the ICC would not admit a case if an individual had

54. Of course not all decisions made by a state (whether arrived at democratically or not)
would be legitimate means of dealing with the past. Legitimacy will rely not only on the process
through which the decision is made but also on the substance of the decision. Foy example, it
would have to meet some minimum requirements forjustice. It is beyond the scope of this paper
to explore what this substantive content would be, however, the triad of obligations discussed
earlier would seem to form a sound starting point. For further discussion on what standards
might be developed as a means of assessing a state's choice for dealing with the past see my
discussion of standards for just amnesty developed in an earlier piece. "Just Amnesty", supra
note 38. Again, I am indebted to Ron Slye for his comments on this issue.
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been granted amnesty through a truth and reconciliation process."

Amnesty, then, could serve as a bar to admissibility just as a previous trial
does under paragraph (c) of Article 17. Some concern might be raised as
to whether this could result in the Court deferring to amnesties that do not,
in fact, promote accountability and redress. This concern could be
addressed in much the same way as that over the genuineness of a
prosecution. The Court could develop standards by which to judge truth
commission processes and evaluate whether they are genuinely committed
to accountability and investigating the truth of what happened, or if they
are merely an attempt to shield individuals from the jurisdiction of the
5 6

Court.

The ICC might thus play an important role in ensuring the legitimacy
of truth commission processes. South African-style truth commissions
can only maintain their legitimacy if the threat of prosecution in the
absence of amnesty is perceived to be real, otherwise there will be no
motivation for perpetrators to participate. One of the difficulties for
countries undergoing democratic transformations is that they often lack
either the will or the resources to pursue prosecutions after a truth
commission process is complete. While it may be too early to pass
judgment in the South African case, since the amnesty committee has
only recently finished its work, there is a general concern that the state
will pursue few if any prosecutions of individuals who did not receive or
apply for amnesty.5 7 If this were to become a pattern in countries utilizing
55. Here again, I am referring to an individualized process that includes redress for victims.
56. For a discussion of the standards that might be used see: "Just Amnesty", supra note 38.
Villa-Vicencio, in his discussion of the relationship between the ICC and truth commissions,
also calls for an international mechanism to emerge that could assess various truth commissions
and their initiatives. Supra note I at 221. Also see generally for a discussion of standards for
evaluating amnesties R. 0. Weiner, "Trying to Make Ends Meet: Reconciling the Law and
Practice of Human Rights Amnesties" (1995) 26 St. Mary's L.J. 857.
57. Recent events in South Africa have sent conflicting messages on this issue. The recent
Presidential pardons granted to 33 people described by the President as having been engaged
in the fight against Apartheid included among them some who had been denied amnesty by the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. See D. Donian & L. Flanaga, "Mbeki' s secret amnesty
list revealed" The Star(1 3 May 2002) online: Independent Newspapers <http://www.iol.co.za>
(last modified: 29 May 2002). This has raised questions as to whether the government might
be considering some form of a general amnesty for those engaged in the struggle over
Apartheid. See J. Battersby, "Tutu: pardons make a mockery of TRC" The Sunday Independent
(18 May 2002) online: Independent Newspapers <http://www.iol.co.za> (last modified: 29
May 2002); H. de Wet, "Retired generals and ANC made amnesty deal" The Star (27 May
2002) online: Independent Newspapers <http://www.iol.co.za> (last modified: 29 May 2002).
At the same time, however, the South African police have announced the reopening of one
million cases some dating back as far as thirty years. They have suggested that charges may
follow and could include some of those persons denied amnesty before the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. See L. Oelofse, "Police re-open one million criminal cases" Cape
Argus (10 May 2002) online: Independent Newspapers <http://www.iol.co.za> (last modified:
29 May 2002).
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the truth commission model, it might affect the willingness of perpetrators
to participant in similar commissions in the future. The willingness of the
ICC to step in and prosecute those not granted amnesty would help to
make the stick of prosecutions real and the carrot of amnesty all the more
attractive. The role of the ICC, in this regard, would serve two purposes:
it would encourage countries to make good on the threat of prosecutions,
at least to-some extent, and, failing that, it would conduct prosecutions
itself."8
Conclusion - Protecting States' Options

Of course there is no indication in the wording of the Rome Statute or the
negotiations surrounding its passage that the ICC would limit its jurisdiction
with respect to truth commissions in the way suggested above. 9 Where,
then, does this leave states wanting to preserve the truth commission
option? It seems states are left with two obvious choices - do not sign'
or ratify the treaty, or refuse to cooperate with the Court should it request
extradition of an individual who has received amnesty. Neither alternative
is very attractive or even practical. Under the first option, states would not
become a party to the treaty. Yet many states where truth commissions
might be considered an alternative in the future did sign the treaty and
have already ratified or expressed their intention to ratify." There was a
considerable amount of international pressure to sign the ICC treaty and
similar pressure to ratify. Countries undergoing or contemplating
democratic transition - the very countries most likely to consider the use
of a truth commission model - might feel such pressure particularly
strongly. However, should these states elect not to ratify, this would not
preclude them from calling upon the Court's assistance if needed. Under
the Statute they could accept the jurisdiction of the Court in a particular
case pursuant to Article 12.3.
The other alternative would be for a state to sign and ratify the treaty
but refuse to cooperate with the Court should it assertjurisdiction over an
individual who is being dealt with through a truth commission process or

58. The ICC's prosecutor may decide whether to prosecute in consultation with a state in
cases where the decision not to prosecute those who have been denied amnesty or did not apply
for it was made as a result of a lack of resources, in other words where the state is unable to
prosecute.
59. Although some have argued that the final text of the Rome Statute contains intentional
ambiguities that might allow the Prosecutor or the Court to interpret the Statute so as to allow
for truth commission processes and amnesties. Scharf, supra note 7 at 508, 521-22.
60. The Rome Statute closed for signatures on 31 December 2000 as provided in Article 125.
Thus, the decision as to whether or not to sign has passed.
61. As of May 16, 2002, 139 states have signed the Statute and 67 have ratified. See supra
note 26.
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who has received amnesty through such a process. Failure to cooperate
would constitute a violation of the treaty.62 Under Article 87, if a state
fails to cooperate, "thereby preventing the Court from exercising its
functions and powers under [the] Statute, the Court may make a finding
to that effect and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or,

where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, to the
Security Council. ' 63 It is unclear at this stage to what extent, if any, the
Court will be able to enforce its requests in cases where the Security
Council is not involved. However, it is clear that an indictment by the ICC
would, in most cases, render a domestic amnesty meaningless outside the
borders of the granting country. Individuals charged by the Court would
likely not be able to leave the country in which they enjoy amnesty for fear
that another state might cooperate with the ICC and turn them over to the
Court. 64
There may be a third less obvious option for countries wishing to
utilize a truth commission process. 65 The State might ask the Security
Council to use its power under Article 16 of the Rome Statute to request
the prosecutor not to commence or continue with an investigation or
prosecution. This option would only be open, however, where it could be
argued that a threat to peace and security exists. Even if such an argument
could be made (and there may be reason to believe that the case would not
be hard to make that an internal conflict might threaten peace and
security) the veto power of the Security Council can only effect a twelvemonth suspension of investigation or prosecution. While this suspension
can be renewed, it does not offer any certainty that investigation or
prosecution would not be pursued at some later date when the threat to
security and peace had ceased. Thus, the Security Council veto would not
resolve the problems for truth commissions caused by the pending threat
of prosecution by the ICC.
Yet a further option for states wanting to preserve the truth commission
possibility would be to declare, at the time of ratification, as provided for
in Article 124, that the State will not accept the jurisdiction of the Court
for a period of seven years after the entry into force of the Statute. Seven
years is the amount of time after which amendments to the Statute are
permitted under Article 121. However, this strategy is dependent upon a
state's ability to garner the support of two-thirds of the parties for
62.
63.

Article 87, Rome Statute, supra note 10.
Article 87.7, Rome Statute, supra note 10.

64. The recent Pinochet situation gives this possibility more than an air of reality. Pinochet
was arrested by British authorities on October 16, 1998 while in Britain to receive medical
treatment. He was arrested pursuant to a Spanish arrest warrant.
65. See discussion, supra note 28.
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a proposed amendment with respect to a truth commission exception to
the courts jurisdiction.
It seems from the analysis above that states wanting to preserve their
right to utilize South African-style truth and reconciliation commissions
may have been well advised not to have signed or, if they signed, not to
ratify the Rome Treaty. Admittedly this may only be a marginally
superior option, and is not one that states appear ready to take up. The only
remaining alternative, then, is to advocate for a reconsideration of the
notion of prosecution animating the Court's admissibility standards, to
one that respects not only the sovereignty of national courts, but also the
right of states to pursue accountability and redress via national truth and
reconciliation commissions. Some might be tempted to suggest that there
is no cause for concern at all on this issue because the decision of whether
or not to pursue an investigation and prosecution is within the Prosecutor's
discretion. Article 53 grants the Prosecutor the power to refrain from
investigating a case where he or she determines it would not be in the
interests of justice to do so. Thus, states wanting to preserve the option to
deal with cases through a truth commission process might appeal to the
Prosecutor's discretion on a case-by-case basis and argue that it would
not be in the interests of justice to prosecute. However, making the case
that proceeding through a truth commission approach better serves the
interests of justice would, as discussed earlier, require a substantial
revision of the notion of justice underlying the ICC Statue. 66 For the
discretion of the Prosecutor to be of comfort, one would have to be
confident that he/she will share Kofi Annan' s sense of what is imaginable
within the bounds of the ICC. Further, while one might feel confident that
no prosecutor would ever pursue prosecutions in the case of South Africa,
what of other less romanticized transitions that involve a similar truth
commission processes? What if, for example, a South African-styled
truth commission process was undertaken in Yugoslavia or Rwanda?
Could we be so sure of what a prosecutor might imagine to be possible?
Without a clear interpretation of the meaning of prosecution and what
might be included within its bounds, prosecutorial discretion should be
of little comfort to countries contemplating alternative means of dealing
with past abuses. For such states to proceed with confidence in their work
of dealing with the past they must have some surety from the new Court
that interference in the face of a legitimate truth and reconciliation
process would be an unimaginable insult.
66. See Llewellyn & Howse, supra note 38 in which my co-author and I argue for such a
revision to a restorative conception of justice. But see Scharf, supra note 7 at 524. Scharf argues
that Article 53 could, as it stands, be used to ground an amnesty exception to the jurisdiction
of the ICC.

